Quick Divorce  Revisited by Pollitt, Basil Hubbard
Kentucky Law Journal




Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Family Law Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Special Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky
Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Pollitt, Basil Hubbard (1951) ""Quick Divorce" Revisited," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 39 : Iss. 4 , Article 4.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol39/iss4/4
"Quick Divorce" Revisited
[Since publication of the article, "Quick Divorce," by Basil H.
Pollitt in the March issue of the Journal, the Supreme Court of the
United States has rendered its decision in Johnson v Muelberger, 71
S. Ct. 474, and the following letter, printed herewith for themforma-
tion of our readers, has been received from Mr. Pollitt.]
April 14, 1951
The case of Johnson v. Muelberger, 19 L. W 4177 71 S. Ct. 474,
is indeed an astonishing and bewildering decision. It piles confusion
upon confusion in a field of law already replete with uncertainty
It now seems fairly apparent that the Supreme Court of the United
States is doing all it legitimately can to forward the cause of Quick
Divorce just as I predicted it would in my article under that name in
the March issue (see 39 Ky L. J. 289, at 310). The court is doing this
by invoking the device known to lawyers, particularly New York
lawyers, as Estoppel. The estoppel device was first used by the court
as a major weapon in the Davis case. The victory for Quick Divorce,
however, was won at a fearful cost-the price being the sacrifice of
collateral attack upon a Florida divorce decree absolutely void under
Florida law
The facts in the Johnson case were as follows:
A married X, wife. X died.
A married Y. Y went to Florida in June and on July 29 filed suit
for divorce. A appeared in the suit and contested the case on the
merits, but said nothing about the jurisdiction. Y obtained the divorce.
A then married Z. A died, leaving hIs entire estate to his daughter,
Sophronia, a child of X. Z applied to the Surrogate s Court m New
York (where A had lived all the time) for her statutory dower inter-
est in As estate. The charming Sophroma pleaded, the invalidity of
the Florida decree obtained by Y.
Held, against Sophronia, that the Florida divorce against husband
after his general appearance and contest on the merits, which is not
subject to collateral attack by hIs daughter in Florida, is not subject
to collateral attack by her in New York after hIs death.
By the law in Florida the jurisdiction of the courts in a suit for
divorce depends entirely upon 90 days residence m that state imme-
diately preceding the institution of the suit. Two witnesses must be
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
produced by the plaintiff to prove this point. In a sense they represent
the state s interest in seeing that no fraud is perpetrated upon the
Florida Circuit Courts. The Special Masters in the Miami area are
more concerned with the problem of jurisdiction than with the merits
of the matter. The decision now under scrutiny opens the door very
widely for the perpetration of all kinds of fraud upon the Florida
courts.
It is submitted that the Supreme Court took the De Marigny (43
So. 2d 442, Florida) case too literally The daughter had some sort
of interest in her father s estate at the time Y got her decree of divorce.
Appreciating the 'iaxim that "no one can be the heir of a living per-
son," the daughters interest (which might be likened to a contingent
remainder) should have been held enough for her to make the col-
lateral attack. It seems that Justice Reed was not familiar with Pro-
fessor Jacobs (the leading authority) article on Attacks on Divorce
Decrees. See 34 Mich. L. Rev 749, 950 at 965-971. There should be
a rehearing and Florida should be represented.
BASIL H. POLLITT
